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THE STATUS OF THE PURCHASE MONEY
RESULTING TRUST PATTERN
IN NEW YORK
MILTON A. SILVERMAN
I.

STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW BACKGROUND

the common law rule in New York, where a grant of
realty was made to one, for a consideration paid by another, a trust
resulted in favor of the payor, inevitably and always, by force merely
of the payment, and irrespective of intention.1 This continued to be
the New York rule until 1896 when the legislature enacted the section' from which the current section 94 of the Real Property Law3 is
derived. The legislative rule was then stated to be that title vests in
the grantee, and no use or trust results from the payment to the
person paying the consideration, or in his favor.
We are in this writing only concerned with the effect of the
statute on the person paying the consideration and the grantee, but
it is to be noted that the statute presumes that the conveyance is
fraudulent as against the creditors of the person paying the consideration and that a trust results in their favor to the extent necessary for
them to satisfy their just demands. It is also to be noted that a trust
will result in favor of the payor, under the statute, when the grantee
takes title in his name against the wishes of the payor or without his
knowledge, and where the grantee, in violation of some trust, purchases the property conveyed with money or property belonging to
another.
It is obvious that the legislative thinking behind section 94 is that
there is prima facie a guilty motive on the part of a person who pays
UNDER
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1 Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475 (1857).
2 Laws of 1896, c. 547, § 74.
3 "A grant of real property for a valuable consideration, to one person, the consideration being paid by another, is presumed fraudulent as against the creditors, at
that time, of the person paying the consideration; and, unless a fraudulent intent is disproved, a trust results in favor of such creditors, to an extent necessary to satisfy their
just demands; but the title vests in the grantee, and no use or trust results from the
payment to the person paying the consideration, or in his favor, unless the grantee either,
(1) Takes the same as an absolute conveyance, in his own name, without the
consent or knowledge of the person paying the consideration, or,
(2) In violation of some trust, purchases the property so conveyed with money or
property belonging to another."
Section 94 of the Real Property Law and its predecessors apply only to realty.
Bork v. Martin, 132 N. Y. 280, 30 N. E. 584 (1892).
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for property but puts title in the name of another. 4 The statute is
silent, however, on the case of innocent motive, and it directs in absolute terms that no use or trust shall result to the person paying the
consideration.'
The issue is thus raised as to whether equity may grant any relief
to the person paying the consideration when it is established that he
acted with an innocent motive.
The answer to this question is not simple or one of easy solution,
as is evidenced by the frequent and bitter litigation on the subject.
The case of Foreman v. Foreman8 provides us with an excellent starting point. Husband paid for a house and lot with his own funds but
took title in his wife's name, all with an innocent motive. Wife had
promised to reconvey to husband at his desire and husband, after the
purchase, managed the property, paid the taxes, insurance premiums,
interest on the mortgages, and the cost of improvements and repairs.
He at all times acted as the owner of the property.
The wife has died and her estate refuses to reconvey the property
to husband. The problem would not be different had she been alive
and had refused to reconvey. Can the innocently motivated husband
obtain a reconveyance of the property in equity in fulfillment of an
oral trust?
In construing section 94 Judge Cardozo could have said that the
section has absolutely put an end to the rule that a purchase money
resulting trust arises by virtue of the fact of payment or he could
have said that the statute should bar the creation of the trust only
where a guilty motive is found. He took the former course and unequivocally held that the statute has put an end to the common law
rule that a trust inevitably results by the force of mere payment.
II.

THE CONSTRUCTIV

TRUST

However, he did not leave the plaintiff without a remedy. He held
that the statute has no effect on trusts constructively imposed as a
4 Notes to 1 N. Y. REv. STAT., p. 722.
Another reason offered for this legislation is that this type of transaction marred
the land records recording system by causing off-the-record titles. This objection can
hardly be considered as substantial in view of the basic proposition that a trustee, the
holder of legal title, always has the power to convey good title to a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice, even though the right to do so was lacking, and thereby cut
off the beneficial interest of the beneficiary.
5 In Siemon v. Schurck, 29 N. Y. 598 (1864), where B paid the purchase price for
realty and took title in the name of C for the benefit of D, the court held that a valid
trust results in favor of D, the statute not applying, since its purpose was to shut off
a trust in favor of B.
6 251 N. Y. 237, 167 N. E. 428 (1929).
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consequence not of payment alone, but of payment combined with
other equities. By the convenient equitable device of the constructive
trust Judge Cardozo apparently created an easy form of relief in these
cases, and this without direct assault upon the prohibition of section 94.
"Nothing in the statute, as to the implication of resulting trusts is at
war with this conclusion." 7
Under this technique title promptly will go to the beneficiary,
payor, since the constructive trust like the resulting trust, is passive
and legal title shoots through the trustee, grantee, into the beneficiary.'
New York is not a vesting state, however, so that the decree is not
sufficient to pass title. The grantee would under the threat of contempt, have to convey to the payor, or under New York's appointive
statute,9 a court officer would make the conveyance.
Now that the constructive trust has been made available as a
remedy, we must determine when equity will apply this form of relief.
It must be remembered that the constructive trust is quite a different
species than the express trust that we normally think of when the word
trust is used. It has been aptly said that "constructive trusts are no
more trusts than quasi-contracts are contracts... .'", A better orientation will result if one thinks of the application of this remedy in terms
of restitution rather than trusts. Under the prevailing American view
both constructive and resulting trusts have been defined as implied
trusts as distinguished from-the express trust, both private and charitable, which depend for their existence on the intent of a property
owner directly and expressly stated.11 The term resulting trust has
traditionally been used to cover the case where equity is obliged to
decree that a legal owner of property is a trustee thereof because it
has found or inferred an actual or presumed intent that he be so
classified. Thus where a settlor conveys property in trust to a trustee
under an express trust and the trust can not be consummated, the
court will hold that a trust results in favor of the settlor or his estate

on the theory that that must be what the settlor intended. On the
other hand the constructive trust is not based on any intent, it being
an involuntary trust imposed by the court to prevent fraud or unjust
7

Ibid.

8 BOGERT, HNDBoox, TRuSTS, 201 (3d ed., St. Paul, 1952).
Q New York Civil Practice Act § 979.
10 NEWr Ai, TRusTS, 201 (2d ed., New York, 1955).
11 BOaRT, op. cit. supra note 8, § 71.

308

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

['VOL. 2

enrichment. Such a trust would be categorized as a "fraud-rectifying"
trust by a learned writer on the subject."2
The rationale of the New York common law rule of Garfield v.
Hatmaker 3 concerning the purchase money resulting trust is easy to
understand. Where P pays for realty with his own funds, but takes
title in the name of T, nothing more appearing, a trust thereby results
in P's favor, because the court infers that that is what P must have
intended. However section 94 has shut off the power of equity to imply
any resulting trusts by inferring the intention of the payor. Justice
Cardozo, however, seized upon the concept of the constructive trust
which requires no intention to be inferred. As we have seen, the constructive trust is involuntary and is "fraud-rectifying."
Once we accept Cardozo's proposition that section 94 bars only
the resulting trust and not the constructive trust, the rationale of his
decision should be simple and easy to apply. He decided that a constructive trust could be imposed in consequence of payment in combination with other or extrinsic equities. In the subject case the payor's equities were reinforced by a promise to reconvey, the relation of
husband and wife, and by unequivocal acts of confirmation and performance. He made it quite clear that to allow the grantee to retain
the property under these circumstances would be to sanction unjust
enrichment.
It would thus appear that the equitable policy against unjust
enrichment outweighs the public policy prohibition announced in section 94. It is clear that equity's policy against fraud outweighs its
policy against unjust enrichment because in cases where a fraudulent
motive caused the title to go into another's name, equity will grant no
relief to the payor, but will leave the parties as it found them, notwithstanding the fact that the grantee is thereby left with the
property. 14
We are concerned here, however, with equity's action when the
motive is innocent. The rule is well established in New York that
equitable relief is set in motion under cover of a confidential relationship."5 It is apparent then that the first step in applying Cardozo's
formula in the Foreman case is to find the confidential relationship.
12 Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting and Constructive,
27 HAav. L. REv. 437 (1914).
13 15 N. Y. 475 (1857).
14 Pattison v. Pattison, 301 N. Y. 65, 92 N. E. 2d 890 (1950).
'5 Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255 (1923).
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He specifically stated there that the payor's equity was reinforced by
the relation of man and wife. He further acknowledged its presence
in the case when he quoted the New York rule that the Statute of
Frauds does not obstruct the recognition of a constructive trust effecting an interest in land where there has been abuse of a confidential
relationship.1 6
III.

THE CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP

While most of these cases take place within the area of the close
family relationship, where there is little problem in finding the confidential relationship, we must nevertheless examine the limits of that
vital requisite. Shortly after Foreman, a case" arose which surprisingly enough turned on the question of whether a confidential relationship existed. The majority opinion stated as follows:
"We disclaim any purpose of holding that the recjuisite confidential relationship must be one found within the confines of a family.
We conceive that it might exist between lawyer and client, doctor and
patient, priest and parishioner, and many other sets of persons, between whom there are bonds of intimacy and trust."
From the dissenting opinion of the same case:
"...we have never attempted to limit or define the nature of the
confidential relationship which may set a court of equity in motion.
Perhaps no such definition can be formulated which would cover all
cases." "Myriad are the circumstances which may give rise to such
relationship. The parties may be united by blood, family affection,
close friendship or business relations."
Although the two opinions seem to talk liberally and similarly,
they reached different conclusions, the majority finding no confidential relationship between the payor and the grantee. The facts were
that the Normar Corporation paid for the realty but took title in the
name of Malex Corporation, which grantee executed a purchase money
bond and mortgage. Both corporations were owned and controlled by
the same parties, two brothers, and they had in a similar fashion purchased and taken title to several parcels of realty.
In October of 192 Malex conveyed title to all but one of the
parcels to Normar, admittedly for no consideration. In May of 1930
a deficiency judgment was entered against Malex after a mortgage
16 This is also the prevailing American view. See Costigan, Trusts Based on Oral
Promises, 12 MICH. L. REV.515 (1914).
17 Fraw Realty Co. v. Natanson, 261 N. Y. 396, 185 N. E. 679 (1933).
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foreclosure caused by a default in May of 1929. Thus Malex was
left with one property, which went in foreclosure. The mortgagee now
seeks to set aside the conveyances to Normar on the ground that they
were in fraud of creditors.
The defense of Normar was that Malex held only naked legal title
and that these conveyances were made to Normar as the true owner.
Normar contended that if Malex did not convey to Normar, equity
could impose a constructive trust and force Malex to convey. Normar
contended that it acted toward Malex as the husband acted toward
the wife in the recent Foreman case; that it collected all the rents
payable to Malex and used them as its own; that it paid all the costs
of maintenance; that the trust relationship rested on the basis of an
original understanding between the two owners.
The majority, as was pointed out, found no confidential relationship between the two corporations, and buttressed its holding by stating that the corporate entity of Malex, must be disregarded where
such an entity is used as a clock or cover for fraud or illegality.
The dissent brushes away the argument against the confidential
relationship and finds that the relation is clearly present and further
holds that the use of Malex as a corporate entity is not fraudulent, in
fact corporate existence is endowed by the state largely for such use as
took place here. As far as the promise to reconvey is concerned, the
dissent finds that there need be no actual, express promise and that
the same was implicit in the acts of the parties.
In view of the fact that both opinions support the doctrine of the
Foreman case, it is submitted that the dissent is the better reasoned
one. The weakness of the majority is the unexplained holding that a
confidential relationship is lacking. One could not argue with it if it
placed its holding on the ground of guilty motive and thereby confined
the holding to those facts.
It is interesting to note that the dissenting opinion, written by
Judge Lehman, was concurred in by Judge Pound. Judge Cardozo
had already left the Court. Judge Pound is one of those legal scholars
who emphasize the restitutionary aspect of the constructive trust.18
It is the feeling of this writer that the Fraw case is a step backwards
in the application of the constructive trust as a restitutionary device
in the purchase money resulting trust pattern.
18 Pound, Progress of the Law, 33 HAv. L. Rv. 420 (1920).
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IV.

TmE

PROMISE TO RECONVEY

The requirement of the confidential relationship has not proved
to be the chief stumbling block in the application of equitable relief in
this area; that honor must fall to the element of the promise to reconvey. The chief culprit in this area seems to be the case of Weigert
v. Scklesinger.19 This is a pre-Foreman case with similar facts, except
here there was no express promise to reconvey. The plaintiff husband
seeks specific performance of an alleged oral agreement on the part
of his deceased wife that if he took title in her name, she would hold
the property in trust for him and reconvey to him at his request.
The plaintiff was unable to establish any express agreement. The
facts were that when wife learned that husband was about to purchase
and take title in wife's name, she was puzzled and opposed to the plan.
Husband's business partner explained to wife that such things are
frequently done by business people because of the uncertainties of
business and "Then, of course, anytime he needs the money and
should sell the house, you convey it to him or to anybody that he
wants to sell it to." Wife then replied, "Well, if you think that is the
' 20
right way, we will do it that way."

The majority of the Court in the Appellate Division places its
affirmance of a dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there
was no agreement on the part of the wife to hold the property in trust
and therefore there can be no violation of any trust. The Court cited
section 94 and stated that there was no proof that the wife took the
conveyance without the knowledge or consent of husband.
It will be remembered that under the exceptions in section 94 a
trust would result in favor of husband if that latter condition existed.
There is no doubt that section 94 would prevent a trust from resulting
in the subject fact pattern. But what about the constructive trust?
The majority gave no answer other than that it would grant no relief
because there was no agreement, no promise to reconvey.
There was a very vigorous dissent by Rich, J. to the effect that
the evidence clearly established an understanding between the parties
that the wife would convey the property at the husband's request,
and that this negatives any intention of a gift on the part of the
husband.
10 150 App. Div. 765, 135 N. Y. S. 335 (2d Dep't 1912), aff'd 210 N. Y. 573, 104
N. E. 1143 (1914).
20 Ibid.
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This pre-Foreman case is important because it has been cited
since the Foreman case as being distinguishable therefrom on the
ground that there was no promise to reconvey.
In 1949 in an action to impress a trust, for the benefit of plaintiff, on certain realty in the name of defendant 2 ' we find a most
startling application of the Weigert case. In dismissing the complaint the court held that where there is no allegation in the complaint that the defendant took title to the property without the
consent or knowledge of the plaintiff, who paid the consideration, or
that the defendant purchased the property with money belonging to
plaintiff in violation of some trust, the property was in legal effect, a
gift to defendant. The sole authority for this proposition given by
the Court is the Weigert case and section 94.
The court in effect said that unless the two exceptions to section
94 are present it cannot impress a trust. This in 1949, twenty years
after the Foreman case. It seems never to have heard of the constructive trust but only of the Weigert case, which in 1912 had the
foresight to look for a promise to reconvey. We are never informed
in the instant case whether a confidential relationship was abused
by the breach of a promise, express or implied, to reconvey. This
case is more than just a step backwards in the area of restitutionary
relief.
In 1956 we find a case 2 where a husband seeks a judgment
declaring that he is the owner of a residential house and lot which he
paid for but took title in his wife's name because, as a physician, he
might be subject to some future malpractice judgments which exceeded his insurance protection. This was not in contemplation of
any specific suit or claim but was merely a general precaution. For
about four years, husband and wife occupied the house as their home
and after they separated because of marital difficulties, this action
began.
This court announces that under the Foreman case it is fundamental in New York that equity will enforce a constructive trust,
where one in a confidential relationship to the payor takes title to
realty under an oral promise to reconvey it. It adds that it is inherent
in each such situation that there be a promise or an agreement
breached. It concludes therefore that without such promise or agree21 Brandes v. Agnew, 279 App. Div. 843, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 553 (2d Dep't 1949).
22 Ayers v. Ayers, Vol. No. 135, N. Y. L.
Court, Westchester County, DoscnaR, J.

J. 13,

Col. 5 (March 23, 1956), Supreme
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ment there can be no violation of a trust even though there be a confidential relationship and a purchase with money belonging to the one
claiming the trust. The authority for the conclusion is the Weigert
case. It finds as a fact here that there was no promise to hold the
property for plaintiff's benefit or to convey to him as some future
time, and that he is therefore not entitled to equitable relief.
It is clear that this court understands the principle of the relief
made available under the Foreman case, but it is not clear as to
whether this court requires an express promise or agreement. It relies
on the Weigert case, but in that case the evidence disclosed a very
interesting situation, which could very well have been interpreted as
an implied agreement to reconvey. There could be no argument with
this case if the court said it found no agreement or promise, express
or implied.
V. THE IMPLIED PROMISE TO RECoNVEY
About one month after the Ayers case, a case on almost all fours
arose in Nassau County.23 The plaintiff husband has instituted an
action to have equity impress a constructive trust. The court promptly
announces that the relief sought is based on the doctrine of the Foreman case and it acknowledges the applicability of that case under
the appropriate facts, but it notes a distinguishing feature between it
and the case at bar, the promise to reconvey.
This court does not cite the Weigert case. Instead it correctly
points out that a number of cases have held that a trust may be spelled
out even where there is no express promise to reconvey where there
has been an abuse of a confidential relationship, This elusive but
obvious proposition was announced by our highest court in the leading
case of Sinclair v. Purdy, 4 which had to do with impressing a trust
on a conveyance of realty by a brother to his sister based on her oral
promise to hold it for his benefit. Note the language of the court stated
through Cardozo, J.:
"Even if we were to accept her statement that there was no distinct promise to hold it .for his benefit, the exaction of such a promise,
in view of the relation, might well have seemed to be superfluous."
"Though a promise in words was lacking, the whole transaction, it
might be found, was 'instinct with an obligation' imperfectly expressed."
23 Mistretta v. Mistretta, Vol. No. 135, N. Y. L. J. 14, Col. 3 (April 30, 1956),

Supreme Court, Nassau County, HooLrY, J.
24 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255 (1923).
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Notwithstanding its recognition that the promise to reconvey may
be implied, the court in the Mistrettacase found no promise, express or
implied and therefore denied relief.
However, on March 14, 1956, a case bearing facts and convprsations closely resembling the Weigert case was decided in Queens
County Supreme Court 5 Here husband paid for property and took
title in wife's name. Wife has not died but is in a mental institution
and the marriage relation has been annulled.
Husband seeks to impress a constructive trust. On the issue of
the promise to reconvey an adult child of the marriage testified that
his mother had told him shortly before and shortly after the purchase
of the property that the father had bought the house in her name and
that he was going to pay all the bills and that the house was placed in
her name only for business reasons and that the father could sell the
house "like he bought it."
The court impressed a constructive trust on the authority of the
Foreman case, the only case cited. This is obviously a recognition of
the rule that the requisite promise to reconvey in Foreman may be express or implied from the circumstances.
We should now be ready to conclude with a statement that where
one in a confidential relationship to another pays for realty but takes
title in the name of the other, who now refuses to reconvey in breach
of an express or implied promise to reconvey, equity will thereupon impose a constructive trust on the realty.
There still remains though the problem of the husband who effects
the transaction and takes title in wife's name while she is on a vacation
in Europe or more specifically the case of the uncle who paid for realty
and takes title in the name of nephew who is in the army overseas, and
who knows nothing about the deal. How can the grantee in such a
case make a promise of any kind to reconvey? In the actual case,26
when the nephew returned to New York after his military service, he
refused to reconvey. Virtually the same Court which decided the
strange Brandes case refused to grant the innocently motivated uncle
equitable relief in the form of a constructive trust. In this case they
knew of Foreman, but decided that the promise to reconvey required
by that case was absent.
25 Goodman v. Romano, Vol. No. 139, N. Y. L. J. 12, Col. 3 (March 14, 1956),
Supreme Court, Queens County, ScaPPrT, J.
26 Bascombe v. Sargent, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 857 (1950).
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It is the opinion of this writer that this decision is contrary to
the equitable policy against unjust enrichment. The relief in the cases
where there is a promise to reconvey transcends the prohibition of
section 94 in order to prevent unjust enrichment. The refusal of the
Court to imply a promise here to reconvey has caused section 94 to
effectively make this conveyance into a gift. On the other hand it
might be argued by some that to grant relief in this case would be
tantamount to a judicial repeal of section 94, except where the rights
of creditors were involved.
This writer agrees that such a result might be accomplished but
feels that it is consistent with the spirit of the Foreman and Sinclair
holdings of our highest court and with .the theory that the constructive
trust is a restitutionary device. The language of the court in Sinclair
v. Purdy and cited with approval in Foreman v. Foreman is appropriate in conclusion: "It is not the promise only, nor the breach only,
but unjust enrichment under the cover of the relation of confidence,
which puts the court in motion."

